On the channel and type of international disaster aid by Raschky, Paul A. & Schwindt, Manijeh
Policy Research Working Paper 4953





Sustainable Development Network Vice Presidency
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Unit
June 2009
WPS4953Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 4953
Research suggests that a donor country’s decision to 
provide post-disaster assistance is not only driven by 
the severity of a disaster and the resulting humanitarian 
needs in the recipient country, but also by strategic 
considerations. The authors argue that the identification 
of the determinants of the size of disaster assistance is a 
first step in the analysis of the donor’s behavior. Since all 
aid is not motivated by the same reasons, the evaluation 
of the donor country’s behavior requires a second step 
accounting for the type and the channel of aid provided. 
Using data on international disaster assistance between 
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2000 and 2007, the analysis examines both the donor 
countries' decision on the channel (bilateral versus 
multilateral) and the type of disaster relief (cash versus 
in-kind). The empirical results suggest that international 
disaster relief is not as much driven by the needs of the 
recipient country, but also by strategic interests (for 
example, oil or trade relationships) of the donor country. 
Bilateral and cash transfers are used as a vehicle to signal 
strategic interests, while multilateral and in-kind transfers 
are chosen to control for misuse in badly governed 
recipient countries. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Research suggests that by 2015 the number of people affected by natural disasters could rise by 
more than 50 percent to an average of more than 375 million each year (Bailey 2009). Such an 
enormous increase in the number of people facing risks of natural disasters will inevitably 
increase the need for humanitarian assistance. Budget constraints call for an improvement of 
disaster assistance strategies and a more efficient application of scarce resources. Therefore, a 
better understanding of the allocation of disaster relief, including the quantity and quality, is 
necessary. Why did the United States assist in 43% of flood relief cases in Kenya with cash 
transfers and only in 20% of the flood relief cases in Bolivia (despite both recipient countries 
having  comparable numbers  of fatalities from floods between 2000 and 2007)? Why did 
Mozambique receive 59% of United States' flood relief inflows bilaterally and the remaining via 
a multilateral agency, while India received only 14% of its United States' flood assistance 
bilaterally? 
 
In order to shed more light on these questions, we combine aspects of two broad strands in the 
literature on foreign assistance. First, we refer to the literature on the type of aid, with discussions 
on the effectiveness of cash and in-kind transfers, respectively (e.g. Currie & Gahvari 2008). The 
argument of paternalism brought forward in this literature, can be seen as an explanation for the 
tendency to provide in-kind or restricted aid transfers, in particular to recipient nations with weak 
institutions. Recent contributions analyzing moral hazard behavior of the recipient country 
include Amegashie, Ouattara & Strobl (2007) and Svensson (2000). 
 
Second, our paper relates to the vast amount of literature investigating the allocation of foreign 
aid. The seminal paper by Dudley & Montmarquette (1976), which argues that the supply of 
foreign aid will be explained by the donor countrys' demand for foreign aid impact, paved the 
way for a discussion of donors' motives behind contributing aid. The majority of these papers 
showed that foreign aid allocation is determined by the donor countries' strategic and political 
interests rather than by the recipient countries' need. For example, Kuziemko & Werker (2006) 
find that more foreign aid is paid to countries which rotate on a seat in the U.N. security council, 
Dudley & Montmarquette (1976) show that foreign aid is induced by the level of exports from 
donor to recipient countries and the results of Alesina & Dollar (2000) suggest that colonial ties 
result in greater aid allocation. More specifically and of great relevance for this paper, Fink & 
Redaelli (2009)  find that not only foreign aid but also international emergency assistance is 
determined by political and strategic interests. They show that more emergency aid is paid to 
countries which are located closer to the donor country, export oil or were former colonies of the 
donor country. In addition, the results of Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) suggest that U.S. disaster 
relief is driven by the level of media coverage of disasters. By contrast Olsen, Carstensen & 
Hoyen (2003) find a rather limited role of news coverage. They use case-studies in order to show 
that the size of humanitarian assistance is determined by the donor country's interest in stability 
and security in the affected country as well as by the local presence of international organizations 
with lobbying power. The former argument is consistent with what Bermeo (2007) calls strategic 
development or strategic stabilization. According to her argument and in contrast to the above 
mentioned literature, all foreign aid is used for strategic interests. However, development or 
stabilization of the recipient country can be part of the strategic goal as well. In this case, donor 
interests and recipient needs coincide. 
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The analysis so far had a focus on the determinants of the size of aid and emergency assistance, 
respectively, including the implicit assumption that all donors give the same type of aid and use 
the same channels or that all aid is motivated by the same reasons. We argue that the analysis of 
the amount of aid is a necessary first step but not sufficient to derive implications about donor 
countries’ behavior. In order to get a more comprehensive picture on the motivation of donor 
countries’ incentives to provide humanitarian aid and to design more efficient mechanisms of 
international (disaster) assistance, the decision on both the type and the channel of aid need to be 
considered. What criteria does a donor country use in order to decide whether to assist by cash 
transfers or in-kind transfers? Why do countries pay bilateral aid to one country and multilateral 
aid to another? Maintaining  the terminology of Bermeo  (2007)  and distinguishing between 
strategic stabilization goals and non-stabilization goals, we would expect that donor countries try 
to maximize aid effectiveness by their choice of the type and channel of aid, if strategic 
stabilization is the main objective. Whereas we would expect them to choose the type of aid, 
which the recipient country values the highest, when their primary interests are non-stabilization 
goals. 
 
Strategic stabilization requires that transfers reach their desired recipients. However, in 
comparison to cash transfers, restricted transfers, e.g. in-kind transfers, might be better suited for 
the reduction of moral hazard behavior and efficient targeting (e.g. Amegashie  et al. 2007
1, 
Besley & Coate 1991, Gahvari & Mattos 2007, Svensson 2000). Note, that the term cash transfer 
does not include conditional cash transfers. Literature on conditional cash transfers suggests that 
depending on the design this form of assistance can be very effective. For example, Doocy, 
Gabriel, Collins, Robinson & Stevenson (2006) describe the implementation of cash for work 
programs after the Tsunami in Aceh.
 2 Not only the type of aid, but also the channel of aid might 
be relevant for the ability of transfers to achieve stabilization. Opposed to bilateral assistance, 
multilateral agencies might have better information about the risks in aid receiving countries and 
hence  account for them in their allocation decisions  (Weck-Hannemann & Schneider 1991). 
Moreover, since donor countries lack commitment power, Svensson (2000) argues that the 
delegation of aid to agencies which are less risk averse and have plausible commitment 
techniques could provide incentives in the receipient country to generate own effort. On the other 
hand, non-stabilization goals are more probable to achieve, if the aid receiving government 
values the assistance highly. It is reasonable to assume that governments value cash payments 
higher than in-kind payments because they can use it in accordance with their own preferences. 
Moreover, donor countries transferring money directly to recipient governments might be more 
successful in building up political ties, since bilateral transfers are more visible for recipients than 
countries which act anonymously via a multilateral agency. For that reason, strategic stabilization 
goals should increase the probability of multilateral and in-kind transfers whereas non-
stabilization goals should induce bilateral and cash transfers.
3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the theory and derive 
 
 
                                                 
1In fact, Amegashie et al. (2007) investigate how donor countries' choice of the composition of cash and in-kind 
transfers adjusts to changes of the moral hazard behavior of recipient countries. While multilateral donors reward 
(penalize) decreases (increases) in moral hazard behavior by reducing (rising) the proportion of in-kind relative to 
cash-transfers, bilateral donors do not react to changes in moral hazard behavior. 
2For a more detailed analysis of aid programs using conditional cash transfers see Fiszbein, Schady, Ferreira, 
Kelleher, Olinto & Skofias (2009). 
3 Needless to say that the decision on the type and channel of post-disaster assistance is determined by other 
characteristics (e.g. disaster type) as well. Of course we control for these variables in the empirical part of this paper. 4 
 
the signs for the partial derivatives of the probability of the different types of aid. Research 




2  Theory 
 
In order to derive the factors which explain the choice of the type and channel of disaster aid 
made by donor countries, we use a technical framework applied by Huber & Nowotny (2008). 
They analyze an individuals decision to commute and to migrate in another region opposed to the 
possibility to stay in the home region. 
 
First, we allow each donor country to choose between bilateral disaster assistance, multilateral 
disaster assistance and no disaster assistance. The donor country's decision to assist or not and its 
choice between bilateral and multilateral disaster aid are based on two instruments,  which 
according to Bermeo  (2007),  both contribute to foreign policy purposes. First, because of 
strategic reasons,  the donor country might be interested in the stabilization of the recipient 
country in the aftermath of a disaster. Strategic stabilization could, for example, be motivated by 
the intention to mitigate negative spill-over effects on the donor country's economy or to prevent 
large flows of disaster-refugees. Hence, under these circumstances donor interests and recipient 
needs coincide. Second, the donor country might have other strategic interests not related to the 
strategic stabilization goal, which the donor country wants to promote, e.g. political ties to oil 
exporting countries. 
 
To be more precise, consider a donor country with GDP  D Y   which decides a) whether to 
contribute an amount of T  to a country which was hit by a natural disaster and b) whether to 
transfer this amount directly to the recipient government (bilateral (B)) or via a multilateral 
agency (M). Empirical results suggest that it is reasonable to assume that disaster assistance 
contributes to a higher level of stabilization in the recipient country 
h
R S ,  M B h , = ∀  and hence a 
higher utility level of the donating country if e.g. good governance indicators in the recipient 
country are high (Burnside & Dollar 2000). Therefore, the stabilization effect is determined by 
the ability of multilateral and bilateral disaster aid to circumvent the adverse effects of bad 
governance, respectively. Due to a more profound knowledge of the specifics of the recipient 
countries resulting from the presence in affected countries, we assume that the control 
mechanism using multilateral disaster assistance is better compared to the control in the case of 
bilateral disaster assistance. Moreover, Svensson (2000) suggests that the delegation of aid to 
international agencies with fully developed commitment technologies contributes to a higher 
effecieny level. For this reason, stabilization is easier to enforce with multilateral assistance for a 
given level of good governance. Moreover, for higher levels of good governance, strict control 
mechanisms are less of a constraint. In order to gain utility from better access to strategic 
interests 
h
R I ,  M B h , = ∀  in the recipient country, it is important for the donor country to ensure 
that the source of disaster assistance is visible for the recipient country. We assume that bilateral 
disaster assistance is more visible than multilateral disaster assistance and thus secures strategic 
interest in a better way. Assuming an additive utility function, the utility  B U  of a donor country 
choosing bilateral disaster assistance is determined by its own governmental purchases  T YD − , 
by the stabilization effect in the recipient country 
B
R S  and by the strategic advantages 
B
R I  induced 5 
 
by bilateral disaster aid. We formulate the donor country's utility function for bilateral emergency 
assistance as 
 




R D B I S T Y U ε + + + −   (1) 
 
Equivalent to equation (1) the donor country's utility in the case of multilateral disaster assistance 
is 
 




R D M I S T Y U ε + + + −   (2) 
 
The terms  B ε  and  M ε  are random utility components for donating bilateral and multilateral, 
respectively. Apart from bilateral and multilateral disaster assistance, the potential donor country 
can decide not to assist. In this case the donor country's utility is 
 
  . = N D N Y U ε +   (3) 
 
We use equations (1), (2) and (3) in order to calculate the utility differentials between bilateral 
disaster assistance  ) ( B U , multilateral disaster assistance  ) ( M U  and no disaster assistance  ) ( N U . 
 




R N B I S T U U ε ε − + + + − − =   (4) 
 
 




R N M I S T U U ε ε − + + + − − =   (5) 
 
Equations (4) and (5) state that higher levels of stabilization 
h
R S  achieved with bilateral and 
multilateral disaster aid as well as higher strategic gains, increase the utility of disaster assistance 
in comparison to not assisting. However, assistance bears costs in the form of a reduction in a 
donor country's government purchases. 
 








R B M I I S S U U ε ε − + − + − − =   (6) 
 




R S S −  increases the utility gain from 




R I I −   increases the 
utility gain from bilateral disaster assistance. 
 

























R MB I I S S − + − Ω =   (9) 
 
and rewrite (4), (5) and (6) as 
 
  , = B BN N B U U ξ + Ω −   (10) 
 
with  N B B ε ε ξ − = . 
 
  , = M MN N M U U ξ + Ω −   (11) 
 
with  N M M ε ε ξ − = . 
 
  ( ) B M MB B M U U ξ ξ − + Ω − =   (12) 
 
Equations (10) - (12) state that countries will decide not to assist, if  BN B Ω − < ξ  and  MN M Ω − < ξ . 
However, for  BN B Ω − > ξ   and  MN M Ω − > ξ   there will be bilateral or multilateral disaster 
assistance, depending on the relation of  BN Ω  and  MN Ω . Countries will choose bilateral disaster 
assistance for  BN B Ω − > ξ   and  MB B M Ω − − < ) ( ξ ξ , whereas they will  assist via a multilateral 
agency if  MN M Ω − > ξ  and  MB B M Ω − − > ) ( ξ ξ . 
 
We can now determine the probability that a donor country chooses bilateral assistance  ) ( B P , 
multilateral assistance  ) ( M P  and no assistance  ) ( N P . 
 
  ( ) ( ) B M MB B BN B Pr P ξ ξ ξ − − Ω − Ω < ; > =   (13) 
 
 
  ( ) ( ) B M MB M MN M Pr P ξ ξ ξ − − Ω − Ω > ; > =   (14) 
 
 
  ( ) M MN B BN N Pr P ξ ξ − Ω − Ω < ; < =   (15) 
 
Using comparative statics we can derive the derivatives of probabilities of assisting by bilateral 
or multilateral transfers and not assisting (see table 1). 
 
  
Table  1: The choice between bilateral, multilateral and no disaster assistance subject to 
selected variables  
   
      T     
B
R S     
M
R S     
B
R I     
M
R I  
  B P     -    +    -    +    - 
M P     -    -    +    -    + 





Now that we have determined the partial derivatives of the probabilities to pay bilateral disaster 
assistance, multilateral disaster assistance and no assistance, we vary the options of the donor 
country, by distinguishing between cash (C) and in-kind (IK) transfers in the case of bilateral 
assistance. In accordance to (1) - (3), we formulate the donor country's utility depending on the 




















R D M I S T Y U ε + + + − =   (18) 
 
 
  N D N Y U ε + =   (19) 
 
Note that in-kind transfers are assumed to cause some additional transportation costs  ) (C , which 
will be higher for large distances between donor and recipient country. Moreover, we would 
expect that in-kind transfers can better control for the adverse effects of bad governance 
compared to cash transfers, whereas cash transfers might be valued higher than in-kind transfers 
from the aid receiving country and hence be more suited for achieving strategic goals. Using the 
same approach as above, we determine the following signs of the partial derivatives of the 
probabilities to choose cash, in-kind, multilateral or not any assistance (see table 2). 
 
  
Table  2: The choice between cash, in-kind, multilateral and no disaster assistance subject 
to selected variables  
   
      T     
IK
R S     
C
R S     
M
R S     
IK
R I     
C
R I     
M
R I     C  
  IK P     -    +    -    -    +    -    -    - 
C P     -    -    +    -    -    +    -    + 
M P     -    -    -    +    -    -    +    + 









3  Empirical analysis 
 
3.1  Research design and data 
 
We are interested in the decision of potential donor countries (i.e. every country that has not been 
directly affected by a disaster) to provide post-disaster assistance and the channel and type the 
actual donors choose. In order to examine the effect of humanitarian needs of a recipient country 
and strategic interests of a donor country, we construct a basic dyadic data set for each major 
natural disaster (that is included in the EM-DAT data set) in a given country between 2000 and 
2007. For any given disaster in a country, all remaining countries are considered as potential 
donor nations. Including only those cases where one potential donor actually provided aid in our 
regression  would truncate the data. All potential donors that did not provide post-disaster 
assistance are coded zero and this information is used in the first stage selection estimates. The 
combination of 228 disasters, where information on both the channel and type of disaster aid is 
available,  and 187 potential donor nations, results in a basic dataset of 42,636 observations. 
However, this number is reduced to between 20,077 and 25,836 (depending on the specification) 
due to missing data. Of the aforementioned observations, between 2,603 and 3,123 (depending on 
the specification) observations are actual aid contribution (dependent variable=1). 
 
The dependent variables are dummies that switch to 1 if a donor has contributed post-disaster 
assistance (in the selection equation), switch to 1 if the if the contribution was bilateral (in the 
channel equation) or switch to 1 if the type of contribution was cash (in the type equation). In 
figures 1 and 2 we show the breakdown of total aid in bilateral vs. multilateral and cash vs. in-
kind by major recipients. Pakistan received 602 contributions. Among these 602 contributions, 
463 (77%) were made via a multilateral agency and 139 (23%) were made bilaterally. Peru on the 
other end of the list, received 99 contributions where 54 (55%) where made multilaterally and 45 
(45%) bilaterally. The differences between recipient countries in the type of disaster aid received 
is even bigger. Out of 100 contributions to Haiti only 1 (1%) was bilateral cash, while 
Mozambique received 53 (16%) bilateral aid contributions out of 335 disaster assistance flows. 
The main explanatory variables include indicators for humanitarian needs by the recipient and 
variables accounting for strategic interests of the donor. The former group includes the number of 
fatalities in a disaster (in thousand) and the level of gross domestic product per capita (GDP p.c.). 
The latter group contains information on the donor's trade volume with the recipient and the 
percentage of fuel exports of total merchandise exports by the recipient. These two variables are 
widely used as empirical proxies for strategic interests in the existing aid allocation literature 
(e.g. Fink & Redaelli 2009, Berthelemy 2004). In addition we include dummies for the type of 
natural disaster. 
 
In choosing other relevant covariates, we follow the existing empirical literature (e.g. Fink & 
Redaelli 2009,  Alesina  & Dollar 2000): Size of the recipient country (population), distance 
between donor and recipient, oneness for trade, colonial history between the donor and the 
recipient as well as an updated version of Gartzke's affinity index that is constructed using voting 
patterns in the United Nations General Assembly. The index ranges between 1 (recipient and 
donor always voted the same way) and -1 (recipient and donor never voted the same way). In 
addition we include two dummy variables that account for common religious beliefs and common 
language in the donor and recipient countries. The donor nation’s level of development measured 
via the GDP p.c. is also included. Table 15 gives an overview of the data sources used. 9 
 
 
3.2  Econometric strategy 
 
Based on the theoretical concept in section 2, our goal is to identify the driving factors of the 
likelihood of choosing 1) a certain channel for disaster aid (bilateral vs. multilateral) and 2) a 
certain type of disaster aid (cash vs. in-kind). The decision on both the channel and the type 
however, is conditional on the decision to provide post-disaster assistance at all. The resulting 
selection problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
  0), = ( 0) = , | ( ) | 1 = ( 1) = , | ( = ) | ( 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 y Pr y x y Pr x y Pr y x y Pr x y Pr +   (20) 
 
where  1 y  denotes the selection variable and equals 1 if aid is given, zero otherwise,  2 y  denotes 
the second stage channel (1 if aid is bilateral, zero if multilateral) or type (1 if type of aid was 
cash, zero if in-kind) and  x is a vector of covariates. In our case, the sample selection model 
consists of two stages: The first stage defines the cases where actual post-disaster aid is given. 
The selection variable is a latent variable 
*
1 y  and equals 1 if aid is given. The second stage is the 
outcome stage  and is estimated in two separate specifications. In the first specification it 
describes the cases where bilateral aid was given, while in the second specification it describes 
the cases when cash was contributed rather than in-kind. In either of the two specifications we 
denote this second stage latent variable as 
*
2 y . We derive the following system: 
 
  1 1 1
*
1 = u x y + β   (21) 
 
 
  2 2 1
*
2 = u x y + β   (22) 
 
i x  and  i u  are the explanatory variables and the error terms for the first and the second stage. The 
correlation between the two equations, ρ , indicates if there is actual sample selection. The 
traditional Heckman model (Heckman 1979) requires that the second stage outcome equation is 
estimated using OLS. Dubin & Rivers (1989) developed an extended selection model where 
second stage is estimated using a probit model, which is applied in this paper. The latent 
variables 








0 > 0 < 0










2 y and y if
y and y if
y   (23) 
 
The application of a sample selection model requires unique information in the explanatory 
variables  1 x  and  2 x  to separately identify the parameters in the selection and the outcome stage. 
To deal with this issue we use the donor nation's population as additional selection variable in the 





3.3  Results 
 
The results are structured by the strategic variables of interest, oil and trade. We start presenting 
estimates of the second stage estimates on the decision on the channel of disaster aid including 
the fraction of fuel exports of total merchandise export if a contribution has been made (Table 5). 
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if the contribution was bilateral and 0 if it 
was multilateral. Fatalities do not appear to have an impact on the choice of the aid channel, but 
the number of people affected has a significant positive impact. More distant countries are also 
more likely to receive aid via a multilateral agency. Countries with a higher fraction of fuel 
exports and better governance indicators are more likely to receive bilateral aid. These results 
allow for interpretations: First, the bilateral channel is preferred over the multilateral channel 
because it is more attributable to the donor and thus supports strategic interests in a better way. 
Second, donors are more likely to give aid via a multilateral agency because these agencies might 
have a better competence in controlling the sound use of the aid in recipient nation's with low 
good governance indicators. 
 
The interaction term of oil and good governance indicators have a negative sign and are only 
significant at the 5%-level for corruption control (column (5)). The signalling effect of bilateral 
aid might by decreasing with better regulatory quality or corruption control. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the first stage selection equation. As expected, countries that have 
suffered more fatalities and where more people where affected from a disaster and that are poorer 
are more likely to receive international disaster assistance. In line with the standard ODA 
literature, donors appear to favor more open recipient countries. Interestingly, smaller nations are 
less likely to receive disaster aid. This result stays in contrast to the small-country bias found in 
ODA decisions. The likelihood of receiving aid increases in the number of fatalities and if donor 
and recipient country have a common language. In accordance  with the findings of Fink  & 
Redaelli (2009) and opposed to the existing literature on ODA decision, affinity does not increase 
the likelihood of receiving aid from a donor. Interestingly, if the donor and the recipient share the 
same religious beliefs, the likelihood of receiving aid significantly decreases. One possible 
explanation for this result is that the data on religion only controls for potential frictions between 
large religious groups and not within the large religious groups (e.g. Sunnite and Shiite). 
 
In the specification presented in column (2) we have included oil (percentage of fuel exports from 
total merchandise exports) as an additional regressor. A higher fraction of fuel exports increases 
the likelihood of receiving disaster aid. These results  remain  robust after the inclusion of 
regulatory quality (column (3)) and corruption control (column (5)). Including the oil variable 
with the good governance indicators (columns (4) and (6)) reveals that the likelihood of receiving 
aid decreases for a recipient nation that has large fuel exports and good regulatory quality and 
increases if the recipient has large fuel exports and good corruption control. 
 
We now turn to the estimates of the specifications using trade volume as the second indicator for 
strategic interests. The results of the aid selection equations in table 8 are pretty similar to the 
first stage results for the oil estimates in table 6. The effects of strategic interests and good 
governance as well as the interaction of these two variables reveal a similar trend for the trade 
estimates. Donors are more likely to donate via a multilateral agency if there has been a major 
disaster causing a large number of fatalities and if the affected country is poor. In contrast to the 
oil estimates, there are differences in the second stage estimates on the channel of aid. The 11 
 
interaction between trade volume and governance indicators is positive and highly significant. 
 
The next step consisted of changing the specification of the second stage estimates and 
examining the decision on the type of aid. The dependent variable is the probability of giving 
bilateral cash. We only present the results of the second stage for both the oil and trade estimates. 
Interestingly, fuel exports do not appear to have a significant effect on the likelihood of receiving 
cash (table 9), while trade volume has a significantly positive effect throughout all specifications 
(table 10). Humanitarian aspects appear to have adverse effects on the likelihood of receiving 
cash. Donors prefer to donate cash to richer nations and after smaller disasters with fewer people 
killed. Regarding the strategic variables we find similar patterns as in the choice of the aid 
channel. 
 
The analysis so far has assumed that the variables that explain the choice on the composition of 
aid do not differ between countries. The empirical literature, however, suggests that donors' 
decision on ODA (e.g. Alesina & Dollar 2000, Kuziemko & Werker 2006) and disaster aid (e.g. 
Fink & Redaelli 2009) are not the same across donor nations. For expositional convenience, we 
limit our analysis to a comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries. This robustness test 
basically splits the sample in OECD and non-OECD donor subsamples and repeats the estimates 
in tables 5 -  10 for each subsample, respectively.
4
                                                 
4We only present the coefficients of the second stage estimates for the key variables. The results of the first stage 
estimates as well as the full estimation table including all other covariates are available from the authors. 
  Unfortunately, the the estimates did not 
converge using a heckman probit estimator. We therefore applied a simple conditional probit 
model, estimating the likelihoods of receiving bilateral aid or bilateral cash conditional that aid 
has been given. Table 11 presents the coefficients of the second conditional probit models for 
both OECD and non-OECD donors decisions on the channel of disaster aid. A first glance reveals 
that the pooled estimates in tables 5 - 10 are mainly driven by the OECD sample. OECD donors 
are more likely to provide bilateral disaster aid if the recipient export share of fuel is large and if 
the recipient nation has good governance indicators. There is a smaller probability of giving 
bilateral aid if the disaster caused a lot of fatalities and if the recipient has a larger per capita 
income. In contrast, fuel exports appear to have a negative and not significant impact on the 
decision on the channel of disaster aid for non-OECD countries. One possible explanation is that 
the majority of donors in this subsample are countries from the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) which are already endowed with large oil resources. Good governance indicators also 
influence the decision in both subsamples, where the coefficients for the non-OECD contries is 
actually larger. Table 12 reports the result for the second strategic variable, trade. Again the 
results of the OECD donor group are comparable to the results of the main sample. The estimates 
for non-OECD again reveal that strategic interests do not play a significant role in their decision. 
We find some indication that the trade relationship between the donor and the recipient has a 
positive and significant influence on the decision to provide bilateral aid. Tables 13 and 14 show 
the results for the probit estimates on the type of aid for each subsample and each strategic 
variable, respectively. Again, the decision on the type of aid is driven by strategic interests in the 
case of OECD countries, while strategic interests have no significant influence on non-OECD 
countries decision. However, the only explanatory variables that have a significant influence in 




4  Conclusion 
 
Research of the past 30 years suggests that foreign aid is allocated due to strategic and political 
interests rather than due to recipient needs. The aim of this paper was to show that strategic 
concerns not only dominate the choice of the size of aid, but also the decision on the type and the 
channel of aid. Our theoretical results suggest that donor countries assist by multilateral or in-
kind transfers rather than by bilateral or cash transfers, if their main interest is the stabilization of 
the recipient country, whereas they choose bilateral or cash transfers if they account for non-
stabilization goals. The empirical application shows that a) recipient countries with good 
governance are rewarded by bilateral or cash transfers, b) countries with lower levels of GDP p.c. 
or higher death tolls are more probable to receive multilateral or in-kind transfers and c) the 
probability of getting bilateral or cash assistance increases if the donor country has strategic 
interests (e.g. oil or trade) in the receiving country. Moreover, we find that good governance is 
less of a constraint for bilateral or cash transfers if the donor country has strategic interests in the 
same country. We show that donor countries deliberately choose the type and channel of aid in 
conformity with their goals, however, strategic interests seem to dominate stabilization goals. 
Interestingly, the reasons to provide bilateral aid as well as cash aid differ between OECD 
countries and non-OECD countries. OECD countries are more likely to give bilateral aid and 
cash if the recipient has oil resources, is a trading partner and has sound institutions. In contrast, 
non-OECD countries’ decisions on the channel and type are not influenced by strategic interests. 
These countries are more likely to provide bilateral aid and cash if the recipient has suffered a 
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Table 3: List of recipient countries' total fatalities and number of disasters  
Recipient    Fatalities    Disasters    Recipient    Fatalities    Disasters  
 Afghanistan    669    6    Lao, PDR    15    1  
Albania    1    1    Madagascar    602    5  
Algeria    971    4    Malawi    567    3  
Argentina    23    1    Malaysia    80    1  
Armenia    n.a.    1    Maldives    102    2  
Azerbaijan    31    1    Mali    2    2  
Bahamas, The    1    1    Mauritania    1    1  
Bangladesh    2,309    4    Mexico    84    3  
Belize    44    3    Micronesia, Fed. Sts.    48    3  
Bolivia    271    6    Moldova    -    1  
Botswana    3    1    Mongolia    23    2  
Brazil    50    1    Morocco    708    2  
Bulgaria    17    1    Mozambique    908    3  
Cambodia    403    2    Myanmar    307    2  
Central African Rep.    1    1    Namibia    2    1  
Chile    40    3    Nepal    657    2  
China    1,185    4    Nicaragua    33    4  
Colombia    109    2    Niger    4    2  
Comoros    1    3    Oman    76    1  
Costa Rica    24    4    Pakistan    74,137    7  
Cuba    22    4    Panama    11    1  
Czech Republic    18    1    Papua New Guinea    n.a.    1  
Djibouti    51    2    Peru    815    5  
Dominica    2    1    Philippines    3,070    5  
Dominican Republic    830    3    Poland    27    1  
Ecuador    21    4    Portugal    14    1  
El Salvador    863    3    Romania    33    2  
Ethiopia    498    1    Russian Federation    101    2  
Fiji    17    1    Senegal    28    1  
Georgia    6    3    Seychelles    3    1  
Ghana    72    3    Solomon Islands    52    2  
Grenada    39    1    Somalia    350    2  
Guatemala    n.a.    1    Sri Lanka    35,634    3  
Guinea    n.a.    1    St. Lucia    1    1  
Guyana    34    1    Sudan    85    3  
Haiti    2,857    4    Suriname    3    1  
Honduras    21    2    Tajikistan    27    4  
Hungary    1    2    Thailand    8,449    2  
India    38,730    7    Togo    41    1  
Indonesia    172,214    10    Tonga    n.a.    1  
Iran    28,110    5    Turkey    219    2  
Jamaica    29    4    Uganda    18    1  
Japan    40    1    Ukraine    9    1  
Kenya    173    3    Uruguay    9    2  
Korea, DPR    934    3    Vanuatu    3    3  
Korea, Republic of    210    2    Venezuela    80    2  
Kyrgyzstan    38    2    Vietnam    844    3  
       Zimbabwe    70    1  
 




   
Table  4: List of donor countries' total contributions and number of donations 
  Donor   Total contribution    Events   Donor   Total contribution    Events  
   (in USD)         (in USD)       
 Afghanistan    500,000    2    Iceland    473,627    13  
Algeria    2,489,199    5    India    23,630,944    10  
Andorra    58,386    2    Indonesia    n.a.    1  
Angola    n.a.    1    Iran    347,380    3  
Argentina    n.a.    8    Ireland    40,573,378    131  
Armenia    n.a.    2    Israel    2,357,000    17  
Australia    54,936,086    115    Italy    76,690,358    121  
Austria    11,436,846    40    Japan    445,981,017    195  
Azerbaijan    622,000    4    Jordan    n.a.    3  
Bahrain    n.a.    1    Kazakhstan    n.a.    2  
Bangladesh    100,000    2    Kenya    75,000    1  
Belarus    113,018    1    Korea, DPR    130,000    5  
Belgium    44,886,419    79    Korea, Republic of    1,576,709    22  
Bolivia    n.a.    1    Kuwait    3,366,013    12  
Botswana    482,000    3    Kyrgyzstan    27,093,596    2  
Brazil    200,000    13    Lao, PDR    75,000    3  
Bulgaria    103,717    2    Latvia    446,726    6  
Burundi    20,000    1    Lebanon    n.a.    1  
Canada    108,799,910    204    Lesotho    110,000    2  
Chile    30,000    7    Libya    1,500,000    6  
China    14,009,631    56    Liechtenstein    305,278    7  
Colombia    100,000    5    Lithuania    252,631    5  
Costa Rica    n.a.    1    Luxembourg    12,165,218    46  
Croatia    n.a.    2    Malawi    100,000    2  
Cuba    129,965    7    Malaysia    5,138,948    18  
Cyprus    756,462    17    Malta    10,854,817    1  
Czech Republic    5,498,495    20    Mauritania    200,336    3  
Denmark    60,283,135    146    Mauritius    80,000    3  
Dominican Republic    196,370    3    Mexico    4,127,922    8  
Ecuador    13,237    4    Moldova    455,307    5  
Egypt    300,000    3    Monaco    640,081    16  
El Salvador    n.a.    1    Morocco    496,980    9  
Eritrea    n.a.    1    Namibia    800,000    1  
Estonia    577,084    9    Nepal    235,391    4  
Fiji    9,700    1    Netherlands    101,964,604    139  
Finland    25,055,726    56    New Zealand    15,536,259    50  
France    48,601,080    118    Nicaragua    n.a.    1  
Gabon    200,000    1    Nigeria    1,150,000    3  
Germany    174,339,341    371    Norway    117,858,752    223  
Ghana    100,000    1    Oman    100,000    3  
Greece    27,047,570    51    Pakistan    157,560    3  
Guatemala    n.a.    2    Palau    51,772    2  
Guyana    20,000    1    Panama    n.a.    2  
Honduras    n.a.    1    Peru    111,130    8  
Hungary    1,005,267    19    Poland    6,966,713    25  
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Table 4: List of donor countries’ total contributions and 
Number of donations (cont.) 
Donor  Total contribution  Events 
  (in USD)   
Portugal  10,127,312  30 
Qatar  22,350,468  13 
Romania  2,639,255  8 
Russian Federation  6,615,748  27 
Rwanda  10,000  2 
San Marino  19,807  1 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of)  83,804,806  63 
Seychelles  n.a.  1 
Singapore  4,850,500  23 
Slovakia  2,705,516  21 
Slovenia  709,334  17 
South Africa  3,852,500  10 
Spain  73,199,347  78 
Sri Lanka  n.a.  1 
Sudan  10,000  1 
Swaziland  15,000  1 
Sweden  107,626,853  210 
Switzerland  19,264,147  113 
Syrian Arab Republic  n.a.  5 
Tajikistan  n.a.  1 
Thailand  1,085,202  13 
Trinidad and Tobago  2,625,000  5 
Tunisia  n.a.  3 
Turkey  40,724,138  58 
Ukraine  n.a.  2 
United Arab Emirates  34,668,256  35 
United Kingdom  306,310,134  343 
United States of America  460,435,164  495 
Venezuela  1,800,000  11 
Vietnam  n.a.  1 
Zambia  20,000  3 
 


















Figure  1: Distribution of bilateral and multilateral disaster aid - Major recipients 
   
    
Figure  2: Distribution of cash and in-kind disaster aid - Major recipients 
   




Table  5: Aid & bilateral OIL – 2
nd stage 
) | 1 = ( X bilateral Pr     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)  0.008  0.026  0.024  0.019  0.019 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Ln(Affected)  0.032***  0.024***  0.023***  0.010  0.014** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.053  -0.119**  -0.125**  -0.138***  -0.122** 
  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.060)  (0.054)  (0.055) 
Ln(Population)  -0.103***  -0.100***  -0.100***  -0.096***  -0.099*** 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Distance  -0.070***  -0.082***  -0.082***  -0.082***  -0.079*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Affinity index  0.679**  0.470  0.467  0.546*  0.563* 
  (0.296)  (0.317)  (0.318)  (0.319)  (0.319) 
Common religion  -0.028  0.003  0.002  -0.045  -0.048 
  (0.073)  (0.084)  (0.085)  (0.084)  (0.084) 
Common language  0.137  -0.067  -0.067  -0.019  -0.023 
  (0.088)  (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.122)  (0.129) 
Former colony  -0.091  -0.166*  -0.166*  -0.151  -0.177* 
  (0.090)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor   -0.188***  -0.149***  -0.152***  -0.162***  -0.161*** 
  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.050) 
Fuel exports (% of  0.002**  0.009***  0.008***  0.006***  -0.003 
merchandise exports)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Regulatory quality    0.504***  0.522***     
    (0.091)  (0.122)     
Fuel exports ×       -0.001     
Regulatory quality       (0.004)     
Corruption control         0.387***  0.477*** 
        (0.104)  (0.110) 
Fuel exports ×           -0.014** 
Corruption control           (0.006) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ρ   0.717***  0.793***  0.788***  0.773***  0.776*** 
  (0.120)  (0.123)  (0.123)  (0.121)  (0.119) 
Constant  1.308  1.731**  1.813*  2.197**  2.077** 
  (0.800)  (0.843)  (0.943)  (0.909)  (0.896) 
Loglikelihood   -7258.304  -6054.057  -6053.534  -6056.025  6032.289 
N   3158  2632  2632  2632  2632 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is bilateral, 
a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively.     20 
 
 
Table 6: Aid & Bilateral OIL- 1
st stage  
) | 1 = ( Z aid Pr                   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)         0.158***  0.154***  0.155***  0.153***  0.149*** 
                      (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Ln(Affected)          0.064***  0.056***  0.058***  0.059***  0.055*** 
                      (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)         -0.094***  -0.141***  -0.130***  -0.084***  -0.094*** 
                      (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Ln(Population)           -0.304***  -0.283***  -0.284***  -0.287***  -0.289*** 
                      (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.004***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.004*** 
                      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Distance  -0.070***  -0.072***  -0.073***  -0.072***  -0.072*** 
                      (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Affinity index         -0.627***  -0.601***  -0.601***  -0.599***  -0.588*** 
                      (0.093)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102) 
Common religion  0.115***  0.081**  0.081**  0.079*  0.074* 
                      (0.036)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Common language  0.278***  0.252***  0.249***  0.264***  0.264*** 
                      (0.049)  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
Former colony  -0.009  -0.023  -0.023  -0.020  -0.012 
                      (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.054) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor   0.607***  0.602***  0.602***  0.601***  0.602*** 
                      (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Pop. (in mio.) donor   0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
                      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fuel exports (% of  0.002***  0.004***  0.006***  0.003***  0.012*** 
merchandise exports)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Regulatory quality     0.072  0.044     
    (0.049)  (0.051)     
Fuel exports ×       0.002     
Regulatory quality       (0.002)     
Corruption control         -0.134***  -0.213*** 
        (0.041)  (0.045) 
Fuel exports ×           0.012*** 
Corruption control           (0.002) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant              -1.694***  -1.589***  -1.688***  -2.042***  -1.910*** 
                      (0.350)  (0.390)  (0.398)  (0.400)  (0.407) 
N                     26811  22246  22246  22246  22246 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is aid, a 
dummy that switches to 1 if the donor has made a contribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-
level, respectively.     21 
 
Table 7: Aid & bilateral TRADE – 2
nd stage 
) | 1 = ( X bilateral Pr   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)  0.017  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.018 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Ln(Affected)  0.035***  0.028***  0.028***  0.025***  0.022*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.147***  -0.133***  -0.148***  -0.149***  -0.154*** 
  (0.040)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.049) 
Ln(Population)  -0.254***  -0.244***  -0.257***  -0.240***  -0.253*** 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.002**  -0.002*  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Distance  -0.055***  -0.064***  -0.062***  -0.063***  -0.062*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Affinity index  0.469*  0.387  0.356  0.388  0.360 
  (0.271)  (0.296)  (0.298)  (0.298)  (0.298) 
Common religion  -0.007  0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.008 
  (0.064)  (0.075)  (0.076)  (0.075)  (0.076) 
Common language  0.165**  0.049  0.036  0.066  0.015 
  (0.079)  (0.105)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.105) 
Former colony  -0.222***  -0.257***  -0.271***  -0.258***  -0.236** 
  (0.084)  (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.093)  (0.094) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor   -0.159***  -0.150***  -0.160***  -0.156***  -0.173*** 
                      (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.051) 
Trade with donor   0.124***  0.119***  0.142***  0.120***  0.188*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.023) 
Regulatory quality     0.027  -0.184*     
    (0.069)  (0.106)     
Trade with donor ×       0.055***     
Regulatory quality       (0.021)     
Corruption control         0.102  -0.398** 
        (0.088)  (0.158) 
Trade with donor ×           0.117*** 
Corruption control           (0.028) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ρ   0.973***  0.970***  0.950***  0.964***  0.918*** 
  (0.130)  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.140) 
Constant              3.840***  3.735***  4.071***  3.957***  4.052*** 
                      (0.750)  (0.803)  (0.811)  (0.843)  (0.852) 
Log likelihood   -7546.738  -6398.397  -6394.050  -6386.357  -6356.830 
N   3284  2757  2757  2757  2757 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is bilateral, 
a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively.     22 
 
  Table  8: Aid & Bilateral TRADE – 1
st stage   
) | 1 = ( Z aid Pr   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)                0.135***         0.128***         0.128***         0.128***  0.136*** 
                           (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.008)     (0.008) 
Ln(Affected)                 0.062***         0.055***         0.055***         0.060***  0.057*** 
                           (0.003)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)     (0.004) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)               -0.197***        -0.205***        -0.205***        -0.149***  -0.161*** 
                           (0.017)          (0.021)          (0.021)          (0.022)     (0.022) 
Ln(Population)                 -0.399***        -0.372***        -0.372***        -0.374***  -0.384*** 
                           (0.015)          (0.016)          (0.016)          (0.016)     (0.016) 
Trade (% of GDP)        -0.005***        -0.004***        -0.004***        -0.004***  -0.004*** 
                           (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.001)     (0.001) 
Distance        -0.050***        -0.053***        -0.052***        -0.052***  -0.053*** 
                           (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)     (0.004) 
Affinity index               -0.661***        -0.647***        -0.649***        -0.645***  -0.698*** 
                           (0.092)          (0.101)          (0.101)          (0.101)     (0.102) 
Common religion         0.130***         0.100***         0.100***         0.103***  0.112*** 
                           (0.034)          (0.038)          (0.039)          (0.039)     (0.039) 
Common language         0.216***         0.212***         0.211***         0.216***  0.190*** 
                           (0.048)          (0.057)          (0.057)          (0.056)     (0.057) 
Former colony        -0.227***        -0.226***        -0.225***        -0.226***  -0.208*** 
                           (0.051)          (0.054)          (0.054)          (0.054)     (0.054) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor          0.514***         0.516***         0.516***         0.516***  0.515*** 
                           (0.017)          (0.018)          (0.018)          (0.018)     (0.018) 
Pop. (in mio.) donor          0.001***         0.001***         0.001***         0.001***  0.001*** 
                           (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)     (0.000) 
Trade with donor          0.136***         0.126***         0.127***         0.127***  0.176*** 
       (0.008)          (0.009)          (0.010)          (0.009)     (0.011) 
Regulatory quality                           0.018            0.001                         
                        (0.035)          (0.049)                         
Trade with donor ×                                            0.005                         
Regulatory quality                                          (0.010)                         
Corruption control                                                            -0.191***  -0.515*** 
                                                          (0.036)     (0.052) 
Trade with donor ×                                                                       0.085*** 
Corruption control                                                                       (0.010) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Constant           1.209***         0.937**          0.935**          0.397     0.445   
                           (0.376)          (0.422)          (0.422)          (0.418)     (0.421) 
N                            26585            22259            22259            22259     22259 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is aid, a 
dummy that switches to 1 if the donor has made a contribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-
level, respectively.     
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Table 9: Aid & bilateral OIL -CASH - 2
nd  stage 
) | 1 = ( V cash Pr   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.060**  -0.042  -0.055*  -0.044  -0.043* 
  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
Ln(Affected)  0.014  0.008  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.094*  -0.152**  -0.220***  -0.189***  -0.184** 
  (0.053)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
Ln(Population)  0.045  0.028  0.027  0.030  0.031 
  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
Trade (% of GDP)  0.003**  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003* 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Distance  0.011  -0.017  -0.014  -0.017  -0.016 
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Affinity index  -0.129  -0.215  -0.243  -0.191  -0.183 
  (0.302)  (0.337)  (0.337)  (0.334)  (0.333) 
Common religion  0.199**  0.175  0.170  0.149  0.147 
  (0.092)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.108) 
Common language  -0.153  -0.289*  -0.277  -0.272  -0.276 
  (0.120)  (0.168)  (0.169)  (0.169)  (0.170) 
Former colony  -0.369***  -0.553***  -0.557***  -0.551***  -0.567*** 
  (0.129)  (0.166)  (0.166)  (0.168)  (0.164) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor   -0.187***  -0.154**  -0.164**  -0.159**  -0.159** 
  (0.060)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Fuel exports (% of  -0.001  0.002  -0.004  0.001  -0.003 
merchandise exports)   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Regulatory quality    0.228*  0.390**     
    (0.119)  (0.157)     
Fuel exports ×       -0.008     
Regulatory quality       (0.005)     
Corruption control         0.302**  0.341** 
        (0.140)  (0.146) 
Fuel exports ×           -0.006 
Corruption control           (0.007) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ρ   -0.102  -0.044  -0.057  -0.052  -0.052 
  (0.141)  (0.158)  (0.154)  (0.153)  (0.153) 
Constant  -0.170  0.448  1.257  0.994  0.901 
  (0.955)  (1.028)  (1.171)  (1.106)  (1.098) 
Log likelihood   -6631.837  -5529.674  -5527.802  -5526.460  -5511.599 
N    3158   2632   2632  2632  2632 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is cash, a 
dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10%-level, respectively.     24 
 
Table 10: Aid & bilateral TRADE -CASH – 2
nd stage 
) | 1 = ( V cash Pr   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.035  -0.032  -0.033  -0.033  -0.039 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
Ln(Affected)  0.019**  0.008  0.007  0.003  -0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.171***  -0.149**  -0.152**  -0.189***  -0.170** 
  (0.060)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.073)  (0.074) 
Ln(Population)  -0.082  -0.051  -0.051  -0.048  -0.030 
  (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.071)  (0.070)  (0.075) 
Trade (% of GDP)  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Distance  0.018  -0.008  -0.005  -0.007  -0.001 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Affinity index  -0.304  -0.307  -0.324  -0.325  -0.321 
  (0.294)  (0.322)  (0.323)  (0.322)  (0.320) 
Common religion  0.249***  0.206**  0.203**  0.201**  0.201** 
  (0.086)  (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.101) 
Common language  -0.134  -0.239  -0.253*  -0.224  -0.282* 
  (0.116)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.154)  (0.150) 
Former colony  -0.431***  -0.543***  -0.549***  -0.544***  -0.516*** 
  (0.125)  (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.154)  (0.156) 
Ln(GDP p.c.) donor   -0.173**  -0.173**  -0.182**  -0.177**  -0.216*** 
                      (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.071)  (0.071) 
Trade with donor   0.078***  0.049  0.057*  0.049  0.091** 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.041) 
Regulatory quality     0.009  -0.100     
    (0.097)  (0.147)     
Trade with donor ×       0.027     
Regulatory quality       (0.029)     
Corruption control         0.170  -0.266 
        (0.132)  (0.227) 
Trade with donor ×           0.094** 
Corruption control           (0.038) 
Disaster dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ρ   0.052  -0.004  -0.026  -0.009  -0.134 
                      (0.197)  (0.198)  (0.206)  (0.199)  (0.210) 
Constant              1.650*  1.522  1.623  1.978*  1.920* 
                      (0.980)  (1.053)  (1.058)  (1.106)  (1.100) 
Log likelihood   -6908.274  -5846.983  -5846.317  -5784.745  -5784.063 
N   3284  2757  2757  2757  2757 
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is cash, a 
dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10%-level, respectively.     25 
 
Table 11: Aid & bilateral OIL – 2
nd stage - Robustness Test OECD vs. NON-OECD 
) | 1 = ( X bilateral Pr    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.060***   -0.057***   -0.066***  -0.062***  
   (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Ln(Affected)  0.006  0.008  -0.012  -0.008 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.067  -0.053  -0.128*  -0.113 
   (0.064)   (0.078)  (0.069)  (0.070) 
Fuel exports (% of   0.009***   0.011***  0.007***  -0.004 
merchandise exports)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)  (0.005)  
Regulatory quality    0.540***  0.504***       
    (0.119)   (0.157)      
Fuel exports ×     0.002     
Regulatory quality     (0.005)     
Corruption control       0.550***   0.652***  
       (0.134)   (0.140)  
Fuel exports ×          -0.017**  
Corruption control          (0.004)  
  NON-OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.088**   -0.100**   -0.107**   -0.102**  
  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Ln(Affected)  0.033*  0.022  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.064   -0.157  -0.337  -0.290 
  (0.161)   (0.089)  (0.208)  (0.197) 
Fuel exports (%   -0.000   -0.007  -0.003  -0.026** 
of merchandise exports)    (0.004)   (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.011)  
Regulatory quality   0.631**   0.886*  
  (0.305)   (0.512)  
Fuel exports ×     -0.009  
Regulatory quality     (0.014)  
Corruption control       0.901**   1.424*** 
      (0.372)   (0.396) 
Fuel exports ×          -0.035**  
Corruption control          (0.017)  
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent  
variable is bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. ***, **, * indicate  




Table  12: Aid & bilateral TRADE – 2
nd stage - Robustness Test OECD vs. NON-OECD 
) | 1 = ( X bilateral Pr    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.072***   -0.070***   -0.074***  -0.070***  
   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Ln(Affected)  0.006  0.007  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.058  -0.070  -0.111*  -0.108* 
   (0.061)   (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Trade with donor    0.106***   0.135***  0.107***  0.153*** 
  (0.021)   (0.024)   (0.021)  (0.030)  
Regulatory quality    -0.057  -0.332**       
   (0.086)   (0.134)      
Trade with donor ×     0.069**     
Regulatory quality     (0.028)     
Corruption control       0.234**   -0.148  
       (0.117)   (0.216)  
Trade with donor ×          0.081**  
Corruption control          (0.038)  
  NON-OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.077**   -0.074*   -0.088**   -0.080*  
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Ln(Affected)  0.022  0.025  -0.013  -0.022 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.057   -0.062  -0.354*  -0.335* 
  (0.140)   (0.145)  (0.190)  (0.192) 
Trade with donor    -0.022   0.027  -0.030  -0.113 
   (0.036)   (0.051)  (0.035)  (0.075)  
Regulatory quality   0.432**   0.205  
  (0.194)   (0.278)  
Trade with donor ×     0.082  
Regulatory quality     (0.066)  
Corruption control       1.053***   0.294 
      (0.355)   (0.464) 
Trade with donor ×          0.196**  
Corruption control          (0.088)  
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent  
variable is bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. ***, **, * indicate  






Table 13: Aid & bilateral OIL - CASH- Robustness Test OECD vs. NON-OECD 
) | 1 = ( V cash Pr    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.079***   -0.091***   -0.079***  -0.079***  
   (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Ln(Affected)  0.017**  0.009  0.009  0.012 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.170***  -0.244***  -0.181***  -0.172** 
   (0.063)   (0.077)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Fuel exports (% of   0.003   -0.004  0.001  -0.008* 
merchandise exports)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)  (0.005)  
Regulatory quality    0.299***  0.475***       
    (0.112)   (0.145)      
Fuel exports ×     -0.010*     
Regulatory quality     (0.005)     
Corruption control       0.264**   0.347***  
       (0.124)   (0.128)  
Fuel exports ×          -0.014**  
Corruption control          (0.007)  
  NON-OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.006   -0.023   -0.008  -0.005 
  (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.051) 
Ln(Affected)  -0.000  -0.017  -0.013  -0.019 
  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   0.161   0.012  -0.020  -0.008 
  (0.152)   (0.208)  (0.199)  (0.196) 
Fuel exports (%   -0.010*   -0.019*  -0.007  0.005 
of merchandise exports)    (0.005)   (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.025)  
Regulatory quality   -0.125   0.173  
  (0.305)   (0.408)  
Fuel exports ×     -0.013  
Regulatory quality     (0.013)  
Corruption control       0.480   0.360 
      (0.426)   (0.437) 
Fuel exports ×          0.021  
Corruption control          (0.017)  
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent  
variable is cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash.  




Table  14: Aid & bilateral TRADE-CASH - Robustness Test OECD vs. NON-OECD 
) | 1 = ( V cash Pr    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.065***   -0.064***   -0.064***  -0.060***  
   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Ln(Affected)  0.016**  0.017**  0.013  0.013* 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   -0.167***  -0.170***  -0.187***  -0.180*** 
   (0.062)   (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Trade with donor    0.063***   0.068***  0.064***  0.105*** 
  (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.023)  (0.027)  
Regulatory quality    0.082  0.009       
   (0.098)   (0.172)      
Trade with donor ×     0.015     
Regulatory quality     (0.030)     
Corruption control       0.143   -0.285  
       (0.115)   (0.215)  
Trade with donor ×          0.077**  
Corruption control          (0.032)  
  NON-OECD 
Ln(Fatalities)  0.010  0.019  0.000  0.022  
  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.048) 
Ln(Affected)  -0.021  -0.019  -0.033  -0.047** 
  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)   0.129   0.081  -0.052  -0.065 
  (0.145)   (0.150)  (0.181)  (0.180) 
Trade with donor    -0.050   0.010  -0.090  -0.080 
   (0.043)   (0.056)  (0.065)  (0.064)  
Regulatory quality   -0.210   -0.554**  
  (0.231)   (0.270)  
Trade with donor ×     0.130*  
Regulatory quality     (0.073)  
Corruption control       0.457   -0.161 
      (0.372)   (0.504) 
Trade with donor ×          0.196**  
Corruption control          (0.092)  
Notes: Probit estimates. Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent 
 variable is cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash.   




Table 15. Variable Definition and Source 
Variable  Description  Source 
 Fatalities   Total number killed by a natural disaster    EM-DAT, CRED (2008)  
     




Describe which type of natural disaster occurred. 
 
 
EM-DAT, CRED (2008) 
 
Emergency aid   Dummy variables describing the channel 
(bilateral vs. multilateral) and type (cash vs. 
in-kind) of emergency relief 
FTS, OCHA (2009) 
     
GDP   Real GDP per capita (US Dollars in 2000 prices)    Penn World Table Version 6.2 
     
POP  Total Population expressed in thousands    World Bank,  
     World Development Indicators 
     
Distance   Distance between donor's and recipient's    World Bank,  
  capitals    World Development Indicators 
     
Trade   Exports plus Imports of goods and    World Bank, 
  services divided by GDP   World Development Indicators 
     
Corruption 
control  
Perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as influence of elites. 
  
     
Regulatory 
quality  
Perception of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  regulations that permit and promote private    
  sector development.     
     
Governance   Replaces either Corruption control   Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
   or Regulatory quality in Table 16   
     
Democracy   Proxy for the political system in a country.  Marshall & Jaggers  
  Includes information on competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment, constraints 
(2005) 
  on chief executive, regulation and competitiveness 
of participation. 
  
     
Affinity index  Extended Gartzke index on voting patterns   Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009) 
  in the UN General Assembly. Takes a value 
between -1 (donor and recipient never voted the 
same and 1 donor and recipient always voted the 
same. 
 
     
Former colony   Dummy variable   Correlates of War  
  1 = recipient was once donor's colony   2 Project (2008) 
 